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The Debate over the Civil Jury in
Historical Perspective
Hans Zeisel
Friends of the Law School, I am pleased to introduce this
Symposium on the Civil Jury, and thought I would do it best by
sketching out the historical context in which this unending debate
about the merits or demerits of the civil jury has taken place. The
debate began early. In 1788, Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend:
"[It astonishes me to find . . .that [our countrymen] should be
contented to live under a system which leaves to their governors
the power of taking from them the trial by jury in civil cases [and]
freedom of religion ..... "I The civil jury, it seems, was as impor-

tant to Jefferson as the freedom of religion.
I will now make a big jump in time, and turn somewhat immodestly to the year 1952, when this law school began the first
systematic study of the jury system. Two volumes came from that
effort: one on the civil jury, called Delay in the Court;2 the other
on the criminal jury, which we called The American Jury.'
Delay in the Court received its impetus, as did so many things
that have happened in this law school, from Edward Levi, then its
dean. One day he approached us who were working on the jury
project and said: "Everybody is now talking about the jury, primarily as a cause of delay in the civil courts. Why don't you first
study that problem?"
So we did. What we found astounded us. First, we discovered
that an arbitrary choice of procedure, not the jury, accounted for
much of the delay in the Manhattan civil court we studied. The
court had established a special calendar for personal injury jury
t Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, University of Chicago Law School. This
article is adapted from a speech Professor Zeisel delivered to the opening banquet of the
University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium held October 27 and 28, 1989.
Letter from Jefferson to Colonel William Stephen Smith, dated Paris, February 2,
1788, reprinted in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 12 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 7 August 1787 to
31 March 1788 557, 558 (Princeton University Press, 1955).
Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Little,
Brown & Co., 1959). Second edition published in 1979 by Greenwood Press, Inc.
' Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Little, Brown & Co., 1966).
Second edition published in 1971 by the University of Chicago Press.
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trials and gave all other cases trial precedence." No wonder, then,
that personal injury jury trials encountered delay. Secondly, we
concluded that any extra time demanded by a jury trial did not
justify its abolition. Our study found that a jury trial required only
about two-thirds more time than a bench trial of the same case.' If
that extra time requirement for the court for a whole year were
added together, it would require the full-time attention of only one
and a half additional judges. In a court having more than a dozen
judges, it did not seem that this difference was big enough to serve
as serious argument against the civil jury.
In spite of such findings, distinguished legal scholars continued to criticize the civil jury, foremost among them Edwin Griswold, the former dean of the Harvard Law School. This was his
view:
The jury trial, at best, is the apotheosis of the amateur.
Why should anyone think that twelve persons brought in
from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of
general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?7
Efforts to do away with or diminish the civil jury went beyond
theorizing. I recall that in the 1950s, a distinguished New York
state court judge tried to persuade litigants to waive jury trial by
stipulation. He offered them a bench trial before one of a group of
distinguished trial judges specially selected for the purpose; the
promised reward was an immediate trial at a time when the jury
calendar was five years in arrears. The effort failed, because
neither the move to a bench trial, nor the removal of the delay,
proved to be in the interest of both plaintiffs and defendants, a
necessary precondition for such a stipulation.
With respect to defense lawyers, our study produced some surprising results. Our findings showed that, on average, plaintiffs obtain roughly 20 percent more money from juries than they would
have obtained in bench trials of the same cases. One would have
expected defense lawyers to waive the jury trial with some regularity-but they rarely do. Rather, we found that, generally, defense
lawyers often trust a jury more than they trust a judge.

Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in the Court at 29.
Id at 78.
Id at 84.
1962-63 Harvard Law School Dean's Rep 5-6.
From an as yet unpublished manuscript.
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The defense bar has, nevertheless, shown a preference for Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") which aims to remove cases
from the judicial system altogether-away from both jurors and
judges. In spite of persistent efforts to increase the scope of ADR,
it seems that it is not widely practiced unless the procedure is obligatory. In any event, it is not clear that such arbitration provides
adequate justice, nor that it actually saves resources.'
Interestingly, the most massive attack on the civil jury was
launched by neither defense nor plaintiffs' lawyers, but by the federal court system itself, which ostensibly directed its efforts against
the alleged oversize of the 12 member jury as it stood at common
law. If my memory serves me correctly, the attack gained strength
in the late 1960s, when the American Bar Association held its annual meeting in London, and some of its members noted with approval that the English civil jury had been practically eliminated;
only libel and other personal torts were still tried to juries."0 This
observation started what one might call the second reception of the
English common law.
The attack on'the twelve-member jury in the federal system
was mounted cautiously. At first, some judges were encouraged to
try cases before six-member juries by stipulation of the parties.
Then, in March of 1971, the Judicial Conference of the United
States adopted a resolution approving "in principle" a reduction in
the size of the civil jury." The resolution gave the movement toward six-member juries a large boost. At the time of the resolution,
only "five or six districts" provided for a reduced-size jury by local
rule.12 However, in the first nine months of 1971, 29 districts
Forty years ago, we evaluated the beginning of this development in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts as follows: "[Tihis becomes indeed an effective remedy for delay.... And yet
one is hesitant to recommend the solution. First, because it runs the risk of being the first
step in a progressive abdication by the courts. . . . Second, any such system necessarily
conveys an aura of, and will indeed often be, second-class justice: Third, the acceptance of
these systems is enforced by rules which fit ill into our judicial tradition of keeping the
litigants' access to the courts free. And fourth, at a time when a major concern . . . is to
upgrade the status and stature and independence of the judiciary, the utilization of substitute judges seems to be a step in the wrong direction." See Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz,
Delay in the Court at 219-20 (cited in note 2).
" See Benjamin Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 ABA J 950, 951-52
(1970); Anthony T. Augelli, Six-Member Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial
System, 3 Seton Hall L Rev 281, 290 (1972).
" Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 5 (Mar
1971).
12

Id.
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adopted the six-member jury.13 When judges in these districts
duly, but superficially, reported that the six-member jury did its
job as well as the twelve-member jury, the Judicial Conference of
the United States passed a resolution recommending that the size
of the federal civil jury be reduced from 12 to six through congressional legislation or by a ruling of the Judicial Conference. In spite
of continuing prodding, Congress did not oblige. Finally, in 1978,
the Judicial Conference took notice of the fact that 78 of the then
85 circuits had reduced their juries by rule of court, adopted a rule
that enabled any federal court to make the reduction, and left it at
that. 14
Reactions to these developments were diverse and interesting.
There were, of course, jury "abolitionists" who welcomed the reduction of the size of the jury as a first step towards its extinction.
I consider these abolitionists to be much like the magazine editor
who, when he received a certain manuscript, told the author that it
was much too long and had to be cut. After much cutting, the author returned. The editor, still dissatisfied, asked for more cuts,
and so it went two or three times until there were just two pages of
the manuscript left. After some hesitation, the editor said: "It isn't
as good as if you had written nothing, but I will take it." In short,
the abolitionists would only truly be satisfied by a law that would
eliminate civil juries entirely.
Other judges accepted the trend toward reducing the size of
the jury with equanimity because of its potential for saving time
and money. Many-judges, however, felt that it was improper, especially in cases with high stakes, to cut the common law jury in half.
These judges tried and still try to circumvent local rules by encouraging the parties to stipulate to a twelve-member jury, sometimes even ordering one, or at least allowing alternate jurors to
function as ordinary jurors at the end of the trial.
The most interesting reaction came from the districts that
cover the state of Utah. They simply refused to reduce the size of
their juries. I believe I understand why. As one judge explained it,
they wanted to be sure to have at least one non-Mormon on their
juries.
S Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States

Courts 198 (1971).
,1 See Edward J. Devitt, The Six Man Jury in the Federal Court, 53 FRD 273 (1972)
(reprint of address by Judge Devitt, Chief Judge, District of Minnesota, at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference at Lutsen, Minnesota, June 30, 1971).

HeinOnline -- 1990 U. Chi. Legal F. 28 1990

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Utah judge's response points to what is probably the
greatest defect of the smaller jury, namely the greatly reduced likelihood that minorities will be properly represented. 5 My concern
here lies not only with the viewpoints held by demographic minorities, but more importantly with the under-representation of minority views on any issue, such as the death penalty or abortion. The
problem is aggravated by the relative ease with which jurors with
minority views can be removed through peremptory challenges by
the other side. In short, the smaller jury is a poorer representation
of the community from which it is drawn.
Lack of community representation is a serious defect because,
as we found in our studies, the primary contribution of the jury is
to inject into the decision process the community's sense of justice.
We found that in some 20 percent of civil jury trials, judge and
jury come to a different decision on liability;1 6 in the majority of
these cases, the jury reached a different decision precisely because
its own "sense of justice" differed from that of the judge. 7 All of
this evidence points to the most important argument against the
six-member jury: it is a poorer sample of the community and hence
a poorer representation of the community's sense of justice. Admittedly, 12 members do not supply a large sample either, but a sample of six is worse.
Another undesirable consequence of size reduction is the increase in the number of extravagantly high jury awards. On the
whole, jury awards are the result of some averaging of individual
ideas of what should be the right award. Although the law frowns
upon such averaging, it remains a fact of jury life. And smaller juries show larger variations of their average awards. 8
I am pleased to report to you that now, in response to these
defects, a committee of the American Bar Association, composed of
distinguished judges, defense lawyers and plaintiffs' lawyers have
proposed to restore the twelve-member civil jury to the federal
court, albeit with the proviso that ten of the 12 jurors may find a
verdict.

Hans Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 ABA J 367, 368 (Apr 1972).
" Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va L Rev 1055, 1064 (1964).
17 In one of study, we noted that "two thirds of the [jury's] disagreements
with the
judge are marked by some jury response to values." Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury
at 495 (cited in note 3).
"SHans Zeisel ... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
38 U Chi L Rev 710, 717-18 (1971). See also Hans Zeisel, The Verdict of Five out of Six
Civil Jurors: Constitutional Problems, 1982 Am Bar Found Res J 141; Zeisel, 58 ABA J at
369 (cited in note 15).
"
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These jury "restorationists" have been forced to rebut much
criticism concerning the costs of a full-size jury. It turns out that
the annual savings from the reduced juror fees are estimated to be
between eight and ten million dollars.19 This is serious money, but
it accounts for a fraction of one percent of the federal judicial
budget, and for an infinitesimally small fraction of the total federal
budget. Economists will say these are not all the costs-that we
must include the loss to the economy because these people perform
jury service instead of something more productive. Perhaps this is
so. I believe, however, that jury service is not only an enjoyable
experience for most jurors, but also, importantly, that jury service
increases their respect for the legal system. Given our general mistrust of the law, jury service is an asset we should not dismiss
lightly.
Once we realize that the civil jury is here to stay, all of our
criticism should be directed towards helping the jury to do an even
better job. Consider, for instance, the old-fashioned way of instructing juries on the law at the end of the trial. Today, sensibly,
many judges give preliminary instructions to their juries at the
outset of the trial. I would go one step further and suggest that in
longer trials judges instruct the jury every morning within specified
limits. For example, the judge knows which witnesses will appear
that day, and he knows the crucial points on which they will provide evidence. It would not hurt if the judge shared this knowledge
every morning with the jurors. The information would focus the
jury's attention and perhaps increase the jury's interest and participation in what might be a tedious trial.
Still another avenue for helping the jury would be to eliminate
certain "blindfolds" on the jury. For procedural reasons, we withhold from the jury information to which the judge is privy. Professor Shari Diamond of the University of Illinois, with some colleagues, is now studying the consequences of such. rules to see
whether the removal of these "blindfolds" would improve jury
performance.2 0
At present, the most fashionable point of attack against the
civil jury is that it is unable to cope with complex trials. The problem is potentially serious, but before we jump to conclusions, we
should explore more systematically the jury's performance in those
Letter from M.L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, to the author, April 5, 1988.
20 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Jonathan D. Casper and Lynne Ostergren, Blindfolding the Jury, 52 L & Contemp Probs 247 (Autumn 1989).
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complex cases. We should analyze our collective experience on how
well or poorly jurors perform in such cases in order to gain a perspective on the size and the structure of the problem-if, in fact,
there is one. We might include in our research, for comparison, an
exploration of how well, or how poorly, judges have performed in
such cases. Many a complex case has suffered from "mismanagement" when tried solely before a judge. Moreover, jury trial "monstrosities" that last one year, two years and longer should not be
blamed on the jury. No trial should last that long, and an imaginative judge should find a way to reduce the length.
In recent years, a new research tool has emerged that allows us
to learn how juries go about their business: the mock trial. We can
use it, not as is usually done to foster settlement, but in a way that
allows us to learn in detail how juries think and deliberate. In
mock trials we are able to observe jury deliberations through oneway mirrors or through other appropriate monitoring. I do not
mean to anticipate the findings of more systematic research, but it
may suffice to report here that whenever I have seen a great trial
lawyer watch, often for the first time, a jury actually deliberate, he
or she is, as a rule, astounded at how intelligent the process is and
at how effectively 12 jurors of varying abilities perform their difficult tasks.
I come to the end of my remarks concerning what my late
friend and colleague Harry Kalven has called the "elegant experiment of the jury." It would seem that the civil jury has passed the
experimental stage. In spite of all the efforts to diminish its role or
to do away with it entirely, the jury has remained a robust institution. Dean Griswold's resentment of the juror-as-amateur in civil
cases remains unconvincing. Harry Kalven wrote in response to
Griswold a beautiful essay he named "The Dignity of the Civil
Jury." In it he points out that nobody ever doubted that these
same amateurs are fit to make decisions over life and death in
criminal cases.2"
To be sure, very few countries have civil juries, and many
countries have no juries at all. I am not here to argue that we must
have the civil jury. But since we do have it, and since it enjoys
wide and growing acceptance by the community, I think we should
strive to make it even better; whatever criticism we have should be
constructive.
Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1067-68 (cited in note 16).
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There is one final thought I want to leave with you. By the
vagaries of history, the civil jury has become a uniquely American
institution. It has been recognized as such since Thomas Jefferson's time. Let us continue to treat the civil jury with the respect it
has earned by surviving with honor two centuries of doubts and
criticism.
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